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SOCIAL SERVICES IN THE IRON CAGE
Janes Latimore
University of North Carolina
at Charlotte
ABSTRACT: Interview and documentary data from a study of a voluntary
job placement agency revealed that counselors were effectively
weeding out the hard-to-place clients. These clients were the tar-
get population of the agency and its funded programs. The clients
who were weeded out tended to be younger, with less education and
less work experience. Weeding out was accomplished by discouraging
unrealistic clients, and by not retrieving clients who were in-
sufficiently motivated to keep in touch with the counselor. This
marked a change in the counselors' practice compared with an earlier
period, and appeared to be in conflict with the agency's mission,
the counselors' altruistic orientation, and the expressed intent of
the government-funded programs. The change in practice was associated
with increased dependence of the agency and its counselors, and with
the increasing demands for bureaucratic accountability from funding
organizations.
The findings suggest that as social services are increasingly
funded by government, the agencies and practitioners find themselves
in the "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality and accountability,
less able to hold to their organizational purposes and to enact their
altruistic values.
Social services appear to be faced with increasing demands for
rational accountability, as government finances more and more of the
services and on a larger scale. Social services becaxe market
commodities, and calculation of the cost per unit of service beoims
more common. However, the study of one agency indicates that under
some conditions, the detailed specification of goals, standards, and
timetables may be in contradiction with what is often thought to be
the main purpose of such programs: viz., providing services to those
most in need of them.
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Max Weber saw the highly rationalized modern world, with its
typically bureaucratic form of organization, as an iron cage from which
there were few escapes. Once fully established, bureaucracy was said
to be the hardest of all social structures to destroy because of its
technical superiority and because of the dependence it engenders:
societies are increasingly dependent on the "steady and correct func-
tioning" of bureaucracies, and propertyless bureaucrats are "chained"
to their work by their "entire material and ideal existence."
Weber's description of the fully developed bureaucracy is well
known. However, three of the features are important here and should
be mentioned. The first is the connection between discipline and de-
pendence that is implicit in the concepts of impersonal authority and,
at the same time, the motivation of regular salaries and organizational
career prospects. The second is the form that bureaucratic rationality
takes. Personal feelings and emotions are eliminated in the work.
Persons are objectified as "cases," and by implication, performance is
evaluated by case-counting. The third feature is that of accountability.
This is inherent in Weber's description of the hierarchical structure
of bureaucracies: lower-level officials are accountable to those at
the next level up.
Weber did not discuss the role of professions within bureaucratic
organizations. It can be argued, however, that within the organiza-
tion, professionalism serves as a counterweight to bureaucratic de-
pendence, rationality, and accountability. Professionals have trans-
ferrable credentials, are more oriented to the individual case than
the categorical case, and in the ideal are accountable to themselves
and the professional standards for their work. Lubove (1973) has
argued that in the past, social workers had to "attain hegemony within
the agency" in order to attain professional status and autonomy. To
this we might add that professional autonomy was necessary to do the
work consistent with the reformist and altruistic orientations of
early workers in the field.
Externally, however, it is a different situation. The social
services agency must deal with other organizations as an organization,
not as a profession. And as government, the non pareil of bureaucracy,
finances more and more social services, the organizational relation-
ships between government bureaus and social services agencies are
strongly influenced by the bureaucratic imperatives of government.
The dependence that ensues opens the door for the return of bureau-
cratic rationality and accountability. For those professionals
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employed by government bureaus, the emphasis on categorical cases and
case-counting has always defined their struggle with their employers.
Their most persistent complaints are that they are rule-enforcers
rather than client-helpers; that clients are often fragmented among
different bureaucracies or their problems are not covered by abstract
regulations; and that there is an excessive amount of paper work re-
quired (for accountability).
In general, for those in the helping professions, bureaucracy is
like Weber's iron cage, although for a different reason. For Weber,
the issue was freedom. For helping professionals, the issue is
altruism: a feeling concern for others and appropriate, particularis-
tic action. The case study reported here led to this perspective.
The most notable bureaucratic effect observed was the weeding-out of
a substantial part of the target population. This conflicted not only
with the purpose of the funded programs, but also with the mission of
the agency and the altruistic orientation of the counselors.
The Agency and its Mission
The Youth Employment Agency (YEA) is a voluntary agency located
in a large eastern city. The mission of YEA has traditionally been
defined by its Board as providing job placements for youths "in
trouble with the law." Clients are referred to YEA by other agencies.
In recent years, the agency has sought more government funding to re-
main competitive with other organizations in the field, and to expand
its operations. Virtually all agency clients were already unskilled,
and most had not omnpleted high school. The new contract programs,
however, added categorical target populations with additional employ-
ment handicaps: narcotics users, probationers, and parollees. The
agency welcomed these contracts, since it had long laimed to special-
ize in serving the "hardest to place" clients.
Weeding Out Clients
A study of the organization was conducted over a four-year period
(1972-1976). In reviewing client records for one of the new contract
programs, it was observed that clients frequently did not return to
the agency after registration and the initial interview with a counsel-
or. When the problem was discussed with counselors and administrators,
it seemed evident that little was being done to retrieve many of these
clients. This was contrary to the practice of the agency three years
earlier, and was also contrary to the proclaimed "mission" of the
agency, as well as the expressed intent of the funded programs.
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The change in the agency's practice was evident in the increase,
in recent years, in the percentage of clients who did not return after
the initial interview. In 1973, the agency began its first large
contract program involving detailed performance standards, with job
placement and retention quotas, a monthly timetable, and penalties for
sub-standard performance. The following table compares the three-year
period prior to 1973, and the three-year period after 1973, with
respect to the percentages of clients who did not return after one
interview. The figures are derived from a sample of the agency's files.




Prior to 1973, counselors were expected to maintain a list of
clients who were "available for work," along with the type of job
desired and the client's traits and skills. When a suitable job was
available, the counselor put a "hold" on the job and contacted the
client by phone. Clients who did not return after the first interview
were thus not necessarily deprived of a job. Counselors seemed to
work harder at keeping in touch with the client and in encouraging them
with job offers. The "available-for-work system" was based, in part,
on the belief that clients were not sufficiently "motivated" to come
to the agency's office frequently in the quest for a job. By 1976,
however, clients were required to "keep in touch" with the agency's
counselors in order to be considered for job placement. Jobs were
not held for clients, and clients were persuaded to take any job that
was available regardless of their interests, backgrounds, or experience.
The counselors themselves described the new practice as a test of
clients' motivation. One counselor said: "There are different ways
of testing motivation--in terms of how badly does that person want to
be helped. Then you allocate that amount of time to that particular
person. And the other ones just have to be weeded out."
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One counselor described the clients who are "weeded out" as
"the ones who need agency services the most." They were classified
by counselors as not sufficiently '"motivated" to work, compared with
other clients. The counselors had fewer jobs available and focused
their attention on the "more motivated clients" to help assure place-
ments in a ccnpetitive job market.
Examination of a random sample of oases seen in 1974-76 suggested
that at least three variables could be used to characterize the clients
who were weeded out in all programs. These are age, education, and
work experience. The findings are summarized below.
TABLE 2: Client Age and "Weeding Out"
AGE NUMBER NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS
One More than one
16-18 22 14 (64%) 8 (36%)
19-21 32 8 (25%) 24 (75%)
That is, only 36% of clients in this sample who were 18 years or
younger had more than one interview, while 75% of the older clients
had more than one interview.
In addition, only 10% (2 out of 20) of the "one-interview clients"
had 12 years of education, while 23% of the others had at least a high
school education. A few of the latter had some college.
Those clients who received two or more interviews had had an
average of 1.85 previous jobs, while the others had an average of 1.35
previous jobs. The difference here is not striking, though it must
be noted that most clients were young and had relatively little work
experience. Within that context, small differences may be important.
It may also be true that other factors such as kind of job held and
duration of previous employment were important influences on the
counselors' efforts to aid individual clients. However, no analysis of
these factors was possible.
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In general, it appeared that the counselors' criterion of motiva-
tion ("keeping in touch") weeded out the clients who needed help the
most: the youngest, the least educated, and the least experienced.
These clients were more difficult to place on jobs, and were sacrificed
by the agency under the increasing pressure to meet placement and re-
tention quotas. The change appears to be associated with a new type
of contract that demanded greater accountability. The new contracts
did not completely eliminate the counselors' efforts to place in-
dividual clients by "reaching out" for them, but apparently the effort
was more selective and was most focused upon clients sufficiently
"motivated" to keep in touch with the counselor. Frequently, it was
the younger, less educated, and less experienced client who did not
pass this test of motivation.
The Process of Weeding Out
To what extent "motivation" is an independent factor, outside the
counselor's control, is a troublesome and interesting question, but one
which cannot be easily answered here. It appeared most likely that not
all clients are equal in their desire and readiness for work. It also
seems reasonable to suppose that what the counselors say and do has
some effect on the motivation of clients.
A small number of new clients (fourteen) were interviewed for this
study both before and after the first counseling session. On both
occasions, the new clients were asked to estimate their chances of
getting a job they would like and of getting any kind of job. Sometime
later, the records on these clients were examined to see how much
effort they had made to "keep in touch" with the counselor either by
phone or by keeping office appointments, and whether the clients were
placed on jobs or not.
The link between "keeping in touch" and placement on a job was
fairly clear, as expected. None of the three clients who made no effort
to keep in touch were placed. Two of the three clients who made a
sustained effort were placed on jobs; the third client would accept only
one kind of work, and the agency had no jobs of this kind to offer.
Thus, those clients who "kept in touch," who called back, appeared to
have a better chance of placement.
It also appeared that counselors induced motivation for some kinds
of jobs while discouraging clients from believing they could get the
kinds of jobs they wanted. In effect, they pre-screened clients, dis-
couraging those who were hard to place or too highly motivated and
encouraging those who would accept any job to return. Most clients
(5 out of the 9 useable cases) saw less chance of getting a ' they
would like after the first counseling session. Only two clients re-
ported their chances for getting this kind of job improved, and one
of these wanted a messenger job because he "liked to travel." This
was a type of job the agency could easily offer. Most clients
(5 out of 7 cases) saw a greater chance of getting some kind of Job
after the first counseling session. When the client's estimate of
his or her chances of getting a "good job" decreased (as they typically
did), the client made no effort to "keep in touch" unless the estimated
chances of getting a "job of any kind" increased. Even maintaining the
same level of optimism (no change) did not have the same effect.
Thus, job placement depended upon "keeping in touch," and the
effort made to keep in touch depended in part on what happened in the
first eounseling session. It appeared that the weeding out process
involved more than the client's objective demonstration of motivation.
Counselors may have encouraged certain clients to weed themselves out
by co~mmnicating doubts or pessimism regarding the chances of job
placeent.
Undermining Agency Mission
The mission of a voluntary organization is seldom given the atten-
tion it deserves. Mission refers to the sense of purpose of an agency,
defined mattepof-factly in terms of the clientele to be served and the
services to be provided. But beneath the surface, we often find the
fire of crusade, reform, and concern, as well as rudimentary theories
of motivation, power, and stratification.
YEA's mission, strongly influenced by the views of its founder
and long-time Board chairman, was to help juvenile offenders avoid
criminal careers by offering them job counseling and placement. The
mission had survived the transition from a predominantly white
clientele in the 1930's and the postwar period, to one that in recent
years was composed largely of minority groups. In the 1950's, YEA
was an important organization in the city's campaign to "socialize"
the youthful gangs that were prevalent at the time. The agency had
adjusted its intake standards in the 1960's to accommodate the "dis-
advantaged" client as well as the youthful offender, but its primary
purpose was still thought to be serving the latter group. They were
young and hard to place, and YEA viewed itself as being unique in its
concern, for them.
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On the basis of my study, it appeared that this mission was under-
mined in part by the necessity of achieving satisfactory placement
statistics under the agency's new contracts--at a time when the local
labor market was not favorable for unskilled (and stigmatized) workers.
We have already noted that it was the younger, less educated and less
experienced clients who were weeded out. Many of these were young
probationer and parollee clients of the agency's newly-funded Crime
Prevention program--just the sort of program that was most consistent
with YEA's mission. The Crime Prevention program had the highest per-
centage of one-interview clients of all the funded programs: 46% of
a sample of these clients had one interview only, and were not re-
trieved.
In the Addict Program, the average age of clients in 1976 was 28.
These older clients were accepted, even recruited by the counselors
so as to be able to meet contract placement quotas. This was far beyond
the maximum age set by the Board as part of its mission to serve youth-
ful offenders: 21 years of age.
The Board was not aware of these innovations, the effect of which
was to significantly alter the operative mission of the agency.
Bureaucratization of Altruism
It doesn't seem farfetched to think of altruism as a valuable re-
source in a competitive and stratified society. With the expansion
of welfare-state services, certain occupations (including the "helping
professions") become more important as vehicles for the expression of
concern for others. We ignore the full reality of social services
work if we over-dramatize this. But short of that, it seems fair to
say that the welfare state has reduced the urgency of private and per-
sonal altruistic behavior. At the same time, it has created altruistic
occupations. But the practitioners of these occupations may be in-
creasingly hemmed in by the demands for accountability emanating from
the welfare-state bureaucracies. In other words, it may be getting
harder to be altruistic. Whether this is generally so or not is an
open question. But more concretely, it was observed at YEA that while
the counselors reported the most gratification from working on the
difficult cases, these clients were being steadily weeded out. There
was no time to waste on the unmotivated and poorly-prepared client.
One counselor described how "exalted" she felt when one of her
clients had finally been hired after numerous attempts. Another report-
ed, with evident satisfaction, how he had worked with one client over a
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period of three years, a time when the client had trouble keeping jobs
despite a promising beginning each time.
The level of altruism of the agency's counselors was assessed in
other ways. For example, counselors were asked whether they would
accept a job in private industry if it paid $1000 more annually--up to
a hypothetical increase of $4000. They were also asked how they handled
expressions of gratitude from clients. And their previous (and subse-
quent) employment histories were examined. These and other measures
were used to arrive at a rough estimate of the level of altruism of the
counselors. There were, of course, variations among them, and the
general level of altruism was affected by agency recruitment standards
(which tended to eliminate excessively altruistic applicants). But the
counselors were as a whole at least moderately altruistic, with some
at the higher end of the scale devised.
This problem could be analyzed in different ways: e.g., as an
organizational problem, one involving stress, job morale, etc. But we
can also view it in a broader context, having to do with the opportun-
ities for altruistic behavior--the most moral kind of behavior--in
modem societies, and the forces such as scientific management and
bureaucratic accountability that distort the act of concern and label
it as uneconomical and inefficient.
Discussion
Blau's (1963) study of a public employment agency offered some
guidance in understanding the problem. There, performance standards
(and evaluations) led to displacement of organizational goals, unless
mitigated by "professionalism" and "job security." However, work-
performance standards at YEA were seldom measured. "Keeping busy"
seemed to characterize the operating standards. A placement-quota
system for counselors had been tried briefly and abandoned when it
produced conflict and resistance. Thus, YEA's environment was in-
creasingly rationalized, but the agency was not.
Blau's investigation also either did not find or did not find
significant any degree of altruism involved in the work of the counsel-
ors he studied. Varying kinds of concern for clients is not a rare
phenomenon in social service occupations. Social workers, for example,
apparently must learn to control and to manage their concern for the
client. Halmos (1970) has written extensively on this subject: "The
crux of the matter is that love is expressed in all counseling."
The counselor, Halmos added, "cannot but betray his kindness, concern,
and idealism about man in general.. .above all, because of his deter-
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mination to procure more happiness for others." There was abundant
evidence of altruism found in YEA's counselors (making the weeding
out of clients more remarkable). However, Halmos neglects to con-
sider how altruism is severely limited by the demands made by organiza-
tions upon counselors. He also appears to base his observations on
the presumption of a strong profession engaged in individual practice.
Lubove (1973), as we noted earlier, describes social work within
an organizational setting. The growth of professionalism within the
occupation is related to both a desire to escape "the historic affilia-
tions of philanthropy with charity, sentimentalism, and paternalism"
and with a desire for personal and professional autonomy within the
agency.
Social workers have succeeded in establishing a relatively strong
profession based upon specialized education and professional certifica-
tions. Professional definitions of their work carry considerable
weight in the organizations that employ them. At YEA, by contrast,
there was no cadre of professionally trained counselors. Although the
occupation of Vocational Counselor is professionalized to the extent
that there are graduate training programs leading to a degree recog-
nized in the field, YEA rarely hired them. Only two (out of 15) of
the "professional staff" had graduate degrees in vocational guidance,
and one of these was the Executive Director. Not all the counselors
had college degrees. When they did, the degree might be in almost any
field, ranging from Divinity to Marketing.
If a low level of professionalism can be considered as meaning
dependence on the organization, then the counselors at YEA were very
dependent. They were also dependent in another way. Historically,
counselors had not been encouraged to make a career at the agency.
The work, as defined by the agency, did not require costly professional
training and there were few supervisory positions to be filled. Ex-
pansion of the agency in the latp sixties and early seventies was
paralleled by the creation and expansion of other similar agencies
and the growth of minority-affairs positions in private industry.
If counselors did not like working at YEA, there were numerous op-
portunities elsewhere. In recent years, however, the decrease in the
number and size of connunity-action programs and neighborhood service
centers has left fewer alternative job opportunities for YEA counselors.
Moreover, business organizations decreased their hiring of personnel
to coordinate "minority affairs," reducing the number of positions of
this kind into which some YEA counselors had previously moved.
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YEA itself was also in a dependent position. Emerson noted that
Organizations are dependent on their external environment, according
to their need for resources or their ability to perform activities
which the environment requires. Dependence is the obverse of power.
Thompson adds to this the notion that organizations may be dependent
on other organizations supplying inputs (materials, financial resources,
etc.), those disposing of outputs, both, or neither. YEA was seen to
be dependent on both the input and the output side.
On the input side, we may consider financial resources. YEA is a
philanthropic organization, but over 90% of its funding comes from
governmental contracts, and funding is never assured for a long term.
The agency's budget for 1976 was made up of the financial inputs shown
in Table 2.
TABLE 3: Organization Dependence Measured by Financial Inputs (1976)
Source Amount Percent
Governmaent-funded Programs $959,583 93.3%
Chairman's Fund-raising 70,000 (est.) 6.7%
TOTAL $1,029,583
It can be seen that the agency's unrestricted funding, represented
by the Chairman's annual fund-raising, constituted only a small part
(6.7%) of its budget in 1976. In 1972, the unrestricted funding campris-
ed an estimated thirty to forty percent of the agency's budget.
On the output side, the agency has always been dependent on em-
ployers in private industry to accept (i.e., hire) its clients. There
is usually not a strong demand for labor of the kind represented by
YEA's clients. Counselors develop a facility for misrepresenting in
a "positive" direction their clients' qualifications. However, when
economic conditions worsen, as they did after 1972, even these techni-
ques were often fruitless. A decline in the number of unskilled job
openings, and even greater competition for those remaining character-
ized the situation facing the agency's counselors in the mid-seventies.
In 1976, the local unemployment rate was above 11% for much of the year.
Moreover, the Labor Departnent reported in 1976 that the city had lost
-766-
522,000 jobs, mostly in manufacturing between 1969 and 1975.
The combination of these factors appears to have resulted in a
dependent staff within a dependent organization. At the same time,
new contracts demanded more specific performances. It remains to be
seen what the terms of the contracts were, and especially their effects
on the basic mission of the agency, job placement of the hard-core un-
employed.
Prior to 1973, contracts merely stipulated that YEA would accept
a given number of clients referred to it by the funding agency (a
government department), and would make its "best effort" to place them
on jobs. Contracts of the "best-effort" type were typical of the 1970-
72 period, and are associated with the low rate of "one-interview
clients."
The contract for the agency's Addict Program (begun in 1973) states
that "The Contractor (YEA) agrees to place at least 256 enrollees
(clients who are accepted for service)," and that "The Contractor shall
place at least 50% of these persons in jobs on which they shall be re-
tained... for at least 30 working days." Clients were to be offered
a minimum number (3) of placement opportunities. The hirings were to
be verified by the funding agency. A quota of satisfactory job place-
ments was required on a monthly basis under the contract. The funding
agency retained "the discretion to reduce the Contractor's budget or
take other appropriate action if the Contractor's performance falls
substantiallv below the minimum placement levels set forth in the sum-
mary schedule" of the contract.
The Addict Program funded a specified number of staff positions
and other anticipated expenses--even if it did add numerous constraints
aimed at providing guarantees of accountability. The Crime-Prevention
Program, on the other hand, projected an estimated number of clients
(young probationers and parollees) who would, under the contract, have
to be placed on jobs. This flexibility was offset by the fact that
YEA was paid only for actual accomplishments, with scheduled payments
for each initial placement and each retention for specified periods.
Although the contract envisioned "remedial instruction" and "vocational
training" for many of the clients, the schedule of fees made job place-
ment and retention more important to the agency than remediation or
training. This arrangement allowed no fixed income for staff salaries
and overhead. This "purchase of services" contract was essentially
a piecework system, but like the Addict Program contract, it also con-
tained penalties for non-compliance and procedures for monitoring the
work.
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Taken together, these contracts and others required the agency
administrators to be constantly aware of the agency's production ac-
cording to specified contract standards. Monthly reports were compiled,
cmparing targets with performances. Agency success was achieved, in
part, by counting each placement of the same individual towards its
placement quota. But the individual counselors had no quotas, and no
records were maintained showing how each counselor performed. Neverthe-
less, it appeared that the counselors internalized the situation of the
agency; they performed as though they were on a quota system by weed-
ing out the most difficult clients to place and by stimulating recruit-
ment of new clients to replace those weeded out. Much of the time of
the Addict Program's staff was devoted to recruitment of clients.
Conclusions
The implications of these findings for public policy and the social
services are fairly simple, although necessarily quite tentative.
Bureaucratic accountability--involving "bard" standards, rigorous veri-
fication, and meaningful penalties--will produce at least the illusion
of success (such as quantity of job placements), but real success, as
defined by the original purposes of the activity, may remain uncertain,
even elusive. There may be a point beyond which distrust is counter-
productive. This point seems to be reached sooner when one party is
highly dependent on the other or others.
Rationalized accountability appears to have the tendency of ulti-
mately orienting the organization's activity to generating those
categories of statistics that provide for additional funding. Initially,
these statistics are intended to be a perhaps imperfect but necessary
indicator of performance; but as they become incorporated into agency
practice and internalized by counselors, they become increasingly the
goal of the counselors and the mission of the dependent agency. The
agency and counselors, often without knowing it, abandon their original
mission, in order to generate accountability statistics so as to in-
sure the survival of the organization. To do so, they may have to
sacrifice their original goals because those goals are not as easily
quantified.
Centrally for YEA, the rationalization of standards in the perform-
ance contracts resulted in a sacrifice in its original mission, place-
ment of hard core unemployed, in order to gain and maintain contracts.
The new contracts resulted in the agency and its counselors placing
less demand upon thenelves as defined by the intensity of service to
= nts, and a change in the characteristics of clients, serving the
most easily and "objectively" served, and cooling and weeding out the
-768.-
others. A change in the target population was the ultimate outcome.
The hard-core problem client became increasingly isolated from ser-
vices because serving him produces poor or unrewarding statistics.
This process was facilitated by bureaucratic and universalistic
categorizations. To a government bureaucracy, the problem is a
categorical one: drug addicts, delinquents, etc. Within categories,
all are equally "deserving." Thus, it makes little difference if some
are weeded out as long as those who are serviced meet the formal
criteria for service and are satisfactorily processed. This conflicts
with the counselor's altruistic-particularistic tendency to help the
most needy among the category. Here, the altruistic orientation was
outweighed by the bureaucratic-universalistic one. The agency and
its counselors could not simultaneously meet both demands. The contra-
diction, if we may conceive of it as such, was for the time being re-
solved by abandoning the target population to a great extent.
The distrust implicit in accountability and the loss of altruistic
behavior may be the highest costs we pay for bureaucratic efficiency.
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